The value of bodily material : acquiring and allocating human gametes. by Pattinson,  Shaun D.
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
22 March 2013
Version of attached ﬁle:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Pattinson, Shaun D. (2012) 'The value of bodily material : acquiring and allocating human gametes.', Medical
law review., 20 (4). pp. 576-603.
Further information on publisher's website:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/medlaw/fws005
Publisher's copyright statement:
This is a pre-copy-editing author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Medical law review following
peer review. The deﬁnitive publisher-authenticated version Pattinson, Shaun D. (2012) 'The value of bodily material :
acquiring and allocating human gametes.', Medical law review., 20 (4). pp. 576-603 is available online at:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/medlaw/fws005
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
THE VALUE OF BODILY MATERIAL: ACQUIRING AND 
ALLOCATING HUMAN GAMETES 
 
SHAUN D. PATTINSON
*
 
 
Durham Law School & Durham CELLS (Centre for Ethics, Law and the Life Sciences), 
Durham University, UK 
s.d.pattinson@durham.ac.uk 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The UK is facing increasing demand for sperm and eggs for use in medical treatment and 
research. The disparity between supply and demand has led a number of UK bodies to 
recommend the adoption of a national donation system, at least with regard to gamete 
donation for treatment. This article argues that a national gamete donation system would have 
benefits beyond those articulated by bodies such as the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority, the British Fertility Society and the Nuffield Council on Bioethics, because a 
system of this type could facilitate the legal and ethical implementation of donor incentives. 
Three types of incentive are explored and it is argued that a national donation system could 
and should be utilised to implement a mirror exchange scheme or, preferably, an indirect 
mirror exchange scheme. 
 
Keywords: gamete donation, human fertilisation and embryology authority, national donation 
system. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
How should the UK address the increasing demand for human gametes—sperm and eggs—
for use in medical treatment and research? At present, many patients remain childless while 
waiting for infertility treatment using donated gametes
1
 and researchers claim that shortages, 
principally of human eggs, are hindering scientific progress and potential new treatments.
2
 A 
review of fertility clinics by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) 
reported that half were unable to meet demand for treatment with donor sperm and 90% were 
unable to meet demand for treatment with donor eggs.
3
 Despite the development of 
alternatives to donated gametes,
4
 availability thus continues to fall below demand. Similarly, 
the increasing
5
 shortage of human eggs has led to researchers not pursuing their preferred 
                                                 
*
  Director of Durham CELLS and Reader in Law, Durham Law School. 
1
  Waiting times of 3-5 years have been reported for donor eggs for use in infertility treatment: see HFEA, A 
Review of the HFEA’s Sperm and Egg Donation Policies – 2011 (2011) 3. The British Fertility Society 
estimates that we need at least 500 sperm donors a year to meet demand in infertility treatment: BFS, 
Working Party on Sperm Donation Services in the UK: Report and Recommendation (2008) 7. 
2
  See House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, Government Proposals for the Regulation of 
Hybrid and Chimera Embryos. Fifth Report of Session 2006–07. HC 272–I, para 60.  
3
  HFEA, Sperm, egg and embryo donation (SEED) policy review: findings of the clinic survey (2004) paras 
2.3 and 3.3. 
4
  Eg ICSI (intracytoplasmic sperm injection), which involves the injection of a sperm into an egg, has been in 
use since 1992: see HFEA (n 1) 4. This technique reduces the need for donor insemination. 
5
  The HFEA’s long-term data show that egg donation for both treatment and research decreased significantly 
between 2001 and 2006: HFEA, A long term analysis of the HFEA register data 1991-2006 (2008) table 
25a. 
strategy. At one point, experiments were conducted involving the transfer of human material 
into animal eggs instead of human eggs.6 It is frequently noted that some patients and 
researchers travel to other countries for access to donor gametes where there are different, 
often less rigorous, regulatory controls.7 
 In contrast to the national system applying to the donation of blood and organs for 
treatment, there is no centralised network addressing the need for gametes in treatment and 
research. The HFEA was established by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 
(the 1990 Act) to license fertility treatment and research conducted using human gametes, but 
was not tasked with responsibility for ensuring the supply of donors. Since the government is 
currently in the process of restructuring the NHS and regulatory bodies addressing fertility, 
research and tissue—reforms which are to include the abolition of the HFEA in its current 
form by 2015
8—now is a suitable time to reconsider the adequacy of the system for acquiring 
and allocating human gametes. 
 The absence of a body empowered to nationally coordinate the system of gamete 
donation means that approaches to the recruitment of gamete donors for treatment and 
research, and the allocation of donated gametes for treatment, vary between clinics. NHS 
Blood and Transplant (NHSBT) has responsibility for managing the national donation system 
for obtaining blood, tissues and organs for transplantation,
9
 but has no responsibility for 
gametes. The idea of adopting such a system for gamete donation, at least for treatment, has 
widespread support. It has not, however, reached the stage whereby implementing legislation 
has even been proposed by the Government. In 1998, the HFEA expressed its support for the 
‘creation of a regional or national donor service’, noting that the advantages of such a system 
would include facilitating donation, ensuring consistency in data collection, maximising the 
efficient use of the supply of donors and improved matching of patients from ethnic minority 
groups because of access to a wider pool of donated material.
10
 The HFEA indicated that the 
biggest practical hurdle would be the start-up costs. In November 2008, a British Fertility 
Society (BFS) working party on sperm donation services in the UK expressed concern that ‘a 
substantial majority of clinics are struggling to maintain sperm donation services and in some 
parts of the country these services have now ceased’.11 It went on to recommend that the UK 
adopt a nationally co-ordinated approach to the organisation of sperm donation services, 
primarily to ensure ‘economies of scale’ in the costs and effort required to manage and 
maintain donors.
12
 The Nuffield Council on Bioethics, which issued a report on the donation 
of bodily material for treatment and research in October 2011, similarly concluded that ‘there 
should be a coherent managed infrastructure for egg and sperm donation, on the lines of the 
structures currently in place for organ donation’.13 It argued that the state has a ‘stewardship 
role’ to play with regard to the donation of reproductive material—noting that the state has 
already accepted a role in regulating fertility treatment, has adopted guidance recommending 
publicly-funded IVF treatment and has a widely accepted role in protecting the welfare of 
children.
14
 The Nuffield Council also noted that research, and its future potential benefits, is 
                                                 
6
  See F Walsh, ‘UK’s first hybrid embryos created’ BBC news (1 April 2008) 
˂http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/7323298.stm˃. 
7
  Eg Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Give and take? Human bodies in medicine and research (2010) para 
3.83. 
8
 Department of Health, Liberating the NHS: report of the arm’s length bodies review (July 2010) and Public 
Bodies Act 2011. 
9
  See ˂http://www.nhsbt.nhs.uk˃. 
10
  HFEA, Consultation on the Implementation of Withdrawal of Payments to Donors (1998) paras 4.1–4.4 
11
  BPS (n 1) 2. 
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  Ibid. 
13
  Nuffield Council of Bioethics (n 7) para 7.66. 
14
  Ibid para 7.13. 
of ‘vital public interest’15 and the system for obtaining donations of organs and tissues from 
deceased persons for transplantation could be extended to encompass donation of organs and 
tissues for research.
16
 
 This article will argue that the adoption of a national system of gamete donation for both 
treatment and research would have an additional advantage: it would facilitate the legal and 
ethical implementation of donor incentives. Three types of reward/incentive will be examined 
as potential mechanisms for prompting the donation of gametes from those who might not 
otherwise donate. While much can be said about the potential of a national donation system 
to facilitate the legal and ethical provision of financial incentives, it will be argued that such a 
system would be even better placed to enable the legal and ethical provision of non-financial 
incentives. 
 The analysis below will begin by briefly exploring the regulatory context, including the 
increasing need for human gametes and the limited restrictions imposed by the need to 
comply with the provisions of various European instruments. It will then explore the issues 
raised by the provision of financial incentives, before arguing that a national donation system 
would be well placed to ethically implement a form of exchange system in which donors 
would contribute to gain access, or alternatively an increased chance of access, to gametes. 
 
II. THE REGULATORY CONTEXT 
 
A number of recent regulatory developments have, as a side effect, facilitated demand and 
decreased supply of human gametes. Three have been particularly relevant to the treatment 
context. First, single woman and lesbian couples seeking to use donor sperm to become 
parents
17
 have been assisted by the amendment and supplementation of the 1990 Act by the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 (the 2008 Act). The 2008 Act has removed 
the requirement that clinics consider the ‘need of [the future] child for a father’ before 
offering treatment
18
 and adopted additional means by which same sex couples can become 
the legal parents of a child born following assisted reproduction.
19
 Secondly, regulation has 
required increased quality control standards to prevent the transmission of disease and ensure 
good success rates—such regulatory interventions include those connected to the 
implementation of the EU Tissues and Cells Directive (2004/23/EC)—and quality control 
standards have been shown to result in the rejection of the majority of prospective donors.
20
 
Thirdly, donor recruitment rates have been affected by legislative changes to anonymity. 
Children conceived using donor gametes after April 2005 have been granted the right to seek 
identifying information about the donor when they reach eighteen.
21
 This has resulted in a 
drop in the number receiving treatment using donor gametes,
22
 although not in the overall 
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  Ibid para 7.16. 
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  Ibid para 7.40. 
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  See BFS (n 1) 6 (‘just under 40% of registered DI cycles carried out in the UK in 2006 were single women 
and lesbian couples’) and HFEA (n 1) 3–4. 
18
  1990 Act, s 13(5), as amended by 2008 Act, s 14(2)(b). 
19
  See eg 2008 Act, ss 35–47 (recognising a second woman as the other parent) and s 54 (recognising same 
sex couples as potential beneficiaries of a parental order). 
20
  One study found that over 62% of recruited volunteers were rejected as sperm donors: S Paul, S Harbottle, 
and JA Stewart, ‘Recruitment of sperm donors: the Newcastle-upon-Tyne experience 1994–2003’ (2006) 
21(1) Hum Reprod 150, esp 156. 
21
  1990 Act, s 31ZA, as inserted by the 2008 Act and replacing HFEA (Disclosure of Donor Information) 
Regulations 2004/1511. 
22
  In 2005, there were 825 patients treated with donor sperm, compared to 651 in 2008: HFEA (n 1). 
number of donors,
23
 which suggests that most of those who donate for the treatment of others 
are now known donors (ie friends or family of the patient), who donate to only one family.
24
 
The profile of donors has also changed, with sperm donors now over twice as likely to be 
over 30 and already have children of their own.
25
 Gametes are increasingly having to be 
sourced from abroad: about 20% of sperm donors and 2% of egg donors are from overseas, 
compared to 12% and 4%, respectively, in 2005’.26 
 The last two decades have also seen additional demand for reproductive cells in research, 
supported by an expansion of the purposes for which embryo research is permitted by the 
1990 Act. One reason for the increase in research uses for gametes is that it has become 
possible to extract stem cells from embryos
27
 and embryonic stem cells are considered to 
have significant scientific and medical potential. All stems cells have the capacity to self-
renew and become other types of more specialist cells. Bone marrow transplants, for 
example, involve stem cells that have the capacity to regenerate and become three types of 
blood cells: white blood cells, red blood cells and platelets. What is special about embryonic 
stem cells is that they have the potential to become any of the 200 or so cell types in the 
human body (ie they are pluripotent).28 The hope is that it will be possible to reprogramme 
such cells for use in the treatment of a wide range of diseases for which there is currently no 
cure, such as diabetes, Parkinson’s disease and certain types of heart disease.29 It is also 
possible to derive stem cells from cloned embryos produced by the method used to create 
Dolly the sheep.30 This technique involves taking an egg, removing its nucleus (a tiny sac 
containing genetic material) and replacing it with the nucleus taken from a somatic cell (ie a 
normal body cell). In the case of Dolly, the replacement nucleus was taken from a mammary 
gland cell—Dolly the sheep was named after Dolly Parton. The resulting embryo is formed 
without the use of sperm and is virtually genetically identical to the individual providing the 
somatic cell nucleus.31 Derived stem cells should therefore not be rejected by the body of the 
person from whose body the somatic cell is obtained, which could make them particularly 
useful for transplantation into the body of a sick patient. It is far too early to tell whether 
further research in this field will lead to the successful development of new forms of therapy. 
It should be noted that there is ongoing research into alternative sources of pluripotent stem 
                                                 
23
  In 2005, 251 men registered as sperm donors and 921 women as egg donors, whereas these numbers were 
396 and 1,150 in 2008: HFEA (n 1) 4 and ˂http://www.hfea.gov.uk/3411.html˃. 
24
  See HFEA (n 1) 4. It has long been the case that egg donors are more likely to be known to the recipient 
than sperm donors: C Murray and S Golombok, ‘Oocyte and semen donation: a survey of UK licensed 
centres’ (2000) 15(10) Hum Reprod 2133. 
25
  See ˂http://www.hfea.gov.uk/3422.html#3425˃. See further the discussion in DW Riggs and L Russell, 
‘Characteristics of Men Willing to Act as Sperm Donors in the Context of Identity-Release Legislation’ 
(2011) 26 Hum Reprod 266 and E Blyth and L Frith, “The UK’s Gamete Donor “Crisis” – A Critical 
Analysis’ (2008) 28 Critical Social Policy 74. 
26
  HFEA (n 1) 8. 
27
  Stem cells were first extract from human embryos in 1998: see JA Thomson and others, ‘Embryonic Stem 
Cell Lines Derived from Human Blastocysts’ (1998) 282 Science 1145. 
28
  I am here referring to stems cells derived from an embryo that is between 5 and 14 days old: see further P 
Menendez and others, ‘Human embryonic stem cells: potential tool for achieving immunotolerance?’ 
(2005) 1(2) Stem Cell Reviews 151–158 and SD Pattinson, Medical Law and Ethics (3rd edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell 2011) esp 355–356. 
29
  See eg HFEA, Donating Eggs for Research: safeguarding donors (HFEA, 2006) 4. See also the first 
embryonic stem cell trial in the UK: F Walsh, ‘Europe's first embryonic stem cell trial at Moorfields’, BBC 
News, 22 September 2011. 
30
  See I Wilmut and others, ‘Viable Offspring Derived from Fetal and Adult Mammalian Cells’ (1997) 385 
Nature 810. 
31
  They are not quite genetically identical because some genes are outside of the cell nucleus and these are not 
replaced by this technique: see MJ Evans and others, ‘Mitochondrial DNA Genotypes in Nuclear Transfer-
Derived Cloned Sheep’ (1999) 23 Nature Genetics 90. 
cells, which do not necessitate the use of eggs or the destruction of embryos.32 
 The UK has a long history of embryo research and such practices are explicitly permitted 
by the 1990 Act under licence and subject to various conditions.
33
 In particular, the research 
must be ‘necessary or desirable’ for one of the purposes listed by the Act.34 There were 
initially five permitted purposes, but these were expanded in 2001 and then again in 2008 to 
the present eight.
35
 As a result of amendments made by the 2008 Act, it is now clearer that 
the legislation permits embryo research intended to provide only scientific knowledge (ie 
basic, as opposed to applied research) and research into serious injuries not amounting to 
disease, such as spinal injuries.
36
 The UK legislation also specifically permits the creation of 
embryos for research, as opposed to restricting research to embryos initially created for 
fertility treatment, and permits the creation of cloned embryos for research.
37
 Few other 
countries have made this legislative move.
38
 The creation of embryos for research is actually 
prohibited by Article 18(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 
(the Biomedicine Convention). This should not cause future problems for the UK, because if 
it were ever to sign and ratify the Biomedicine Convention, it could make a reservation to this 
provision under Article 36 on the basis that it has pre-existing legislation on the issue. 
 Together, the four regulatory developments outlined above have had a significant impact 
on gamete supply and demand for both treatment and research. 
 
A. Incentives in the Current Regulatory Scheme 
 
The 1990 Act empowered the HFEA to control the giving or receiving of ‘money or other 
benefit’ in respect of the supply of gametes by rendering such activities criminal unless 
authorised by Directions.
39
 The HFEA has regularly reviewed compensation and incentives. 
Clinics were initially permitted to pay donors up to £15 per donation plus reasonable 
expenses.
40
 Consultation in 1998 persuaded the HFEA not to remove this limited payment 
and it went on to permit rewarded egg-sharing in which a woman receives treatment at a 
reduced cost in exchange for donating some of her eggs.
41
 Rewarded egg-sharing was 
subsequently extended to the donation of eggs for research in exchange for reduced IVF 
fees.
42
 The reduction in cost of treatment is typically half or even the full cost of about £5,000 
per cycle.
43
 Sperm-sharing is permitted on equivalent terms. 
 In 2006, following consultation on the pending implementation of the Tissues and Cells 
                                                 
32
  Non-embryonic body cells have been successfully reprogrammed to become pluripotent and these cells are 
known as induced pluripotent stem (iPS) cells: see K Takahashi and others, ‘Induction of Pluripotent Stem 
Cells from Adult Human Fibroblasts by Defined Factors’ (2007) 131 Cell 861 and J Yu and others, 
‘Induced Pluripotent Stem Cell Lines Derived from Human Somatic Cells’ (2007) 318 Science 1917. 
33
  1990 Act, Sch 2 and the discussion in Pattinson (n 27) 361–363. 
34
  1990 Act, Sch 2, para 3A. 
35
  HFE (Research Purposes) Regulations 2001/188 and the 2008 Act. 
36
  See, in particular, Sch 2, para 3A(1)(b) (‘providing knowledge’) and Sch 2, para3A(2)(a)–(b)) (which refers 
to ‘other serious medical conditions’). 
37
  1990 Act, ss 3(1)(a) (creation of an embryo for research) and 1(1) (definition of an embryo). 
38
  Exceptions include Belgium (Law of 11th May 2003, art 4) and Sweden (in legislation passed in 2005). 
39
  ss 12(1)(e) and 41(8)/(9), 1990 Act. 
40
  See HFEA, Consultation on the Implementation of Withdrawal of Payments to Donors (1998), para 1.2. 
41
  See HFEA, ‘Paid egg sharing to be regulated, not banned’, Press Release, 10 December 1998. This was 
confirmed in 2004: HFEA, ‘HFEA confirms UK position on payment for egg donors’, Press Release, 25 
February 2004. 
42
  See HFEA, Minutes of the meeting of the HFEA Ethics and Law Committee, 16 January 2007, para 6.8. 
43
  HFEA (n 1) 9. 
Directive,
44
 the HFEA removed the £15 direct payment and allowed only out-of-pocket 
expenses and a loss of earnings allowance capped at £250. In October 2011, after a further 
consultation,
45
 the HFEA declared that it would take a more proactive approach to donor 
recruitment and retention in the period until its abolition.
46
 It would allow those who donate 
gametes to receive a fixed sum for the expenses and inconveniences of donation: £750 per 
cycle for egg donors and £35 per visit for sperm donors. This level of compensation, which is 
expected to be implemented from mid-2012, is intended to provide financial recompense to 
ensure that donors do not lose out from donation ‘without attracting those who are merely 
financially motivated’.47 With regard to donation for research, it falls short of the Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics’ recommendation for a pilot scheme of significant payments to women 
who donate eggs for research.
48
 Thus, as things currently stand, the UK allows one form of 
incentive for gamete donation (rewarded gamete-sharing) and permits limited payment for 
the inconvenience of donation (which is intended to remove disincentives rather than 
incentivise donation). 
 Regulatory developments in the UK have taken place within an international context. 
There are three European instruments that seek to place restrictions on the offer of incentives 
for donation: the Biomedicine Convention of 1997, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union 2000 (the EU Charter), and the Tissues and Cells Directive. 
 Article 21 of Biomedicine Convention prohibits financial gain in the following terms: 
‘The human body and its parts shall not, as such, give rise to financial gain’. The Convention 
does not define body ‘parts’ or elaborate on the phrase ‘as such’. The Explanatory Report 
states that Article 21 is to be interpreted as applying ‘the principle of human dignity set forth 
in the preamble and in Article 1’ and it includes blood, but not ‘such products as hair and 
nails, which are discarded tissues, and the sale of which is not an affront to human dignity’.49 
We also routinely discard both sperm (following male masturbation or sex with a condom) 
and eggs (in menstruation cycles), but gametes have value extending beyond that of hair and 
nails, and their sale is generally considered to be at least as problematic as the sale of blood. 
As already stated, the UK has neither signed nor ratified the Biomedicine Convention. 
Nonetheless, the more general European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (EHRC) is often said to be a ‘living instrument’50 and it is increasingly being 
interpreted in the light of the Biomedicine Convention. In Glass v UK, the European Court of 
Human Rights cited the Biomedicine’s provisions on consent (Articles 5–9)51 and added that 
it did not consider UK law to be ‘in any way inconsistent with the standards laid down’ in the 
Biomedicine Convention in the area of consent’.52 More recently, in MAK v UK, the 
Strasbourg Court again cited the provisions on consent and declared that UK domestic law 
‘fully accords’ with the Biomedicine Convention.53 Many of the Strasbourg court’s citations 
of the Biomedicine Convention have been to the provisions on consent.
54
 In Vo v France, the 
                                                 
44
  See HFEA, SEED Report: A report on the Human Fertilisation & Embryology Authority's review of sperm, 
egg and embryo donation in the United Kingdom (2005). 
45
  HFEA (n 1) 
46
  HFEA, ‘HFEA agrees new policies to improve sperm and egg donation services’, 19 October 2011.  
47
  Ibid. 
48
  Nuffield Council on Bioethics (n 7) para 57. 
49
  Paras 131 and 132–133, respectively. 
50
  See eg Tyrer v UK (1979-80) 2 EHRR 1, para 31. 
51
  See Glass v UK (2004) 39 EHRR 15, para 58. 
52
  Ibid, para75. 
53
  MAK v UK (2010) 51 EHRR 14, paras 31 and 77 (Arts 5–8). 
54
  See eg Evans v UK (No.6339/05, 10 April 2007) (2008) 46 EHRR 34, para40 (Art 5); Özalp v Turkey 
(No.32457/96, 8 July 2004); and Juhnke v Turkey (No.52515/99, 13 May 2008) (2009) 49 EHRR 24, para 
56 (Art 5). 
Strasbourg court cited the Biomedicine Convention’s absence of a definition of ‘everyone’ in 
Article 1 in support of its interpretation of the Article 2 right to life of the ECHR.
55
 France 
has signed the Convention but has yet to ratify it.  
Interpreting the ECHR in the light of the Biomedicine Convention is only feasible where 
the relevant provision from the latter plausibly elaborates the former. Also, using the 
provisions of a non-binding instrument in this way can surely only be legitimate where there 
are additional reasons, beyond the provisions of the non-binding instrument, for accepting the 
relevant interpretation of the binding instrument. No provision in the EHRC plausibly 
requires its signatories to prohibit financial gain from body parts, although it is not difficult to 
interpret the EHRC as compatible with such a prohibition. Prohibiting persons from selling 
their gametes or services as a gamete donor would appear to engage the Article 8(1) right to 
private life, but Article 8(2) permits interference where it is in accordance with the law and is 
necessary for, inter alia, the protection of health or morals, or the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others. 
The Biomedicine Convention’s prohibition is also incorporated into the EU Charter. 
Article 3 provides that the right to respect for a person’s physical and mental integrity in 
‘medicine and biology’ means ‘in particular’ that respect is to be given to ‘the prohibition on 
making the human body and its parts as such a source of financial gain’. The Charter has 
been given legal force by the Lisbon Treaty, which came into effect on 1 December 2009. 
Under Article 6(1), the Charter is recognised by the EU as having ‘the same legal value as the 
Treaties’, although Article 51 states that the Charter does not extend the competence or 
powers of the EU. The UK, along with Poland, negotiated a protocol declaring that the 
Charter does not extend the jurisdiction of any Court within the EU or UK to find that any 
law, regulation, or administrative provision is inconsistent with the provisions of the 
Charter.
56
 Thus, Article 3 cannot be considered to form part of English law. In any event, like 
the Biomedicine Convention, the EU Charter only prohibits making the body and its parts ‘as 
such’ a source of financial gain, the meaning of which will be considered presently. 
 The Tissues and Cells Directive has more direct legal relevance.
57
 Article 12(1) requires 
Member States to ‘endeavour to ensure voluntary and unpaid donations of tissues and cells’. 
It goes on to declare that donors may receive compensation ‘which is strictly limited to 
making good the expenses and inconveniences related to the donation’ and Member States 
may define the conditions under which such compensation is to be available. Article 12(2) 
requires Member States to ‘endeavour to ensure that the procurement of tissues and cells as 
such is carried out on a non-profit basis’.  
 The Article 12 prohibition has a number of limitations. First, it uses the word ‘endeavour’ 
and thereby does not purport to lay down an absolute requirement. This flexibility permits 
Member States to meet demand by use of financial incentives. Second, while the Directive 
expressly applies to eggs, sperm and embryonic stem cells,
58
 it only applies where these cells 
are ‘intended for human application’.59 As emphasised in recital 11, the ‘Directive does not 
cover research using human tissues and cells’. It will, however, cover the creation of clinical 
grade embryonic stem cell lines where these are intended for human application at some 
future point. Third, the Directive does not define ‘unpaid donation’ except by declaring that it 
                                                 
55
  Vo v France (No.53924/00, 8 July 2004) (2005) 40 EHRR 12, paras 84–85 (Arts 1,2 and 18). 
56
  Art 1(1). 
57
  Even when not implemented, Directives give rise to interpretative obligations on national courts 
(Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA [1990] ECR I-4135, para 8, and Miret v 
Fondo de Guarantia Salaria [1993] ECR I-6911, para 20) and an ‘unconditional and sufficiently precise’ 
provision may be relied on directly against the State in the domestic courts (vertical direct effect): eg Case 
C-152/84 Marshall v Southampton and South West Hampshire AHA [1986] QB 401, para 46. 
58
  Recital 7. 
59
  Articles 2 and 3(d). 
does not include compensation for the expenses and ‘inconveniences’ of the donation. This 
implies that the phrase ‘as such’ in the EU Charter is intended to be compatible with a 
distinction between impermissible ‘payment’ and permissible ‘compensation’ for 
inconvenience. Thus, the prohibition in Article 12 is only aspirational, does not apply to 
gamete donation for in vitro research, and does not encompass payment for the non-financial 
inconveniences of donation. 
 The Nuffield Council on Bioethics has drawn a distinction between ‘recompense’ 
(payment in recognition of losses incurred), ‘reward’ (material advantage that goes beyond 
‘recompensing’ for incurred losses) and ‘purchase’ (payment in direct exchange for a 
‘thing’).60 Article 12 apparently expresses opposition to both purchase and financial reward, 
while supporting recompense. The line between reward and recompense is not 
straightforward, because payments that may merely remove a disincentive to one person may 
provide an incentive to another.  
 Gamete-sharing schemes clearly do not involve the ‘purchase’ of gametes in the sense of 
direct exchange of money for the gametes themselves. Egg-sharing does not involve the 
transfer of money, but it does involve a ‘payment’ that has a clear cash value equivalent. 
Donation of eggs for treatment (but not in vitro research) through an egg-sharing arrangement 
would seem to involve a reward of the type rejected by Article 12. The issue is that there is 
no additional inconvenience for which to compensate the donor where she does not undergo 
any procedures beyond those required for her own treatment. Yet, if we point to the 
possibility that the donor could later need to undergo an additional egg-removal cycle due to 
the donation of eggs that she would otherwise have frozen for her own future treatment, then 
we must still face the fact that the reduction of fees operates in practice as a financial 
incentive, ie as reward rather than mere recompense. The HFEA’s 2011 consultation 
concedes that ‘most egg sharers would not donate if there were no incentive to do so’.61 It is 
thus of significance that Article 12 lays down an aspiration rather than a strict requirement. 
 The rationale for Article 12 can be inferred from the Directive’s recitals, which also 
provide guidance on its proper interpretation. Recital 18 asserts the principle that ‘tissue and 
cell application programmes should be founded on the philosophy of voluntary and unpaid 
donation…., altruism of the donor and solidarity between donor and recipient’. Recital 19 
apparently offers a justification of this principle: ‘Voluntary and unpaid tissue and cell 
donations are a factor which may contribute to high safety standards for tissues and cells and 
therefore to the protection of human health.’ 
 The view, expressed in recital 19, that paying for tissue and cell donations may threaten 
human health relates to the Directive’s jurisdictional basis in Article 152(4)(a) of the EC 
Treaty (TEC), which has subsequently become Article 168(2)(4)(a) of the EU Treaty 
(TFEU). This provision provides for legislative competence to adopt ‘measures setting high 
standards of quality and safety of organs and substances of human origin, blood and blood 
derivatives’. It also forms the jurisdictional basis of the earlier Blood Directive (2002/98/EC); 
Article 20 of which requires Member States to seek to ‘encourage voluntary and unpaid blood 
donations’. Indeed, widespread incidents of HIV/AIDS blood contamination in the 1980s 
provided the political impetus for the inclusion of this jurisdictional competence in the Treaty 
of Amsterdam.
62
 
  The link between (some forms of) payment and increased risk to human health—which is 
expressed rather tentatively in recital 19—was seminally suggested by the sociologist 
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Richard Titmuss in the context of blood donation in his book The Gift Relationship.
63
 
Titmuss cited evidence from the 1960s that suggested that recipients of blood sources from 
paid donors had higher rates of hepatitis than recipients who received blood from voluntary, 
unpaid donors.
64
 This may be explainable on the basis that financial incentives attract 
different types of donors and they have an incentive to hide information about their health 
status that could lead to rejection and thus non-payment. As Farrell has pointed out, those in 
favour of financially rewarded blood donation reject the relevance of data from the 1960s and 
1970s arguing that there are now ‘stricter donor-screening protocols, more sophisticated 
testing and viral inactivation methods’.65 Farrell goes on to analyse HIV/AIDS blood 
contamination episodes in the UK and France during the 1980s to highlight the inadequacy of 
what Titmuss referred to as the ‘gift relationship’ on its own for assessing risks to blood 
safety. 
 Applied to the donation of gametes, the concern would be that financially rewarded 
donors would be more likely to carry or hide transmissible infection or genetic disease. The 
major infections and genetic conditions should be caught by donor-screening protocols and 
blood tests,
66
 but that still leaves the possibility of those that are unknown or not checked.
67
 
There are a number of points to make about the adequacy of this claim as a justification for 
prohibiting the provision of incentives to gamete donors. While studies have demonstrated 
that the risk of disease transmission in blood donation is greater with paid donors than with 
unpaid donors,
68
 there have been no studies demonstrating that paid gamete donation caries 
greater risk of transmitting genetic or infectious disease than gametes from unpaid donors.
69
 
This perhaps explains why the risk to recipients was not cited by the HFEA to support its 
view that payment should be prohibited in its consultation in 2005. Even if such an increased 
risk could be established, its relevance would be restricted to donations of the type covered 
by the Directive, namely, those intended for human application. Infection cannot be 
transferred to a recipient and a child cannot be born with a genetic disorder where the 
material is only used for in vitro research. It would also seem to have little relevance to egg-
sharing arrangements, because patient donors will have been screened and tested for their 
own treatment over an extended period of time and be motivated to maximise their own 
chances of having a healthy child. In short, the effect of incentives on the quality of the 
gametes donated is only relevant to direct financial rewards for donation for treatment and 
even then such concerns are insufficient to justify a ban on incentives. A purposive reading of 
the Directive by reference to recital 19 and its jurisdictional basis would therefore support 
interpreting the requirement to endeavour to ensure unpaid (gamete) donation in terms of the 
possible health effects to the recipient of direct financial reward for donation for treatment or 
applied research. 
 Recital 18, which refers to the value of ‘altruism’ and ‘solidarity between donor and 
recipient’, suggests slightly wider purposes for the Directive. The Nuffield Council defines an 
altruistic action as ‘one that is primarily motivated by concern for the welfare of the recipient 
of some beneficent behaviour, rather than by concern for the welfare of the person carrying 
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out the action’.70 It defines ‘solidarity’ as the idea that ‘we’re all in this together’, which has 
‘an implication of mutual obligations and mutual support within a definable community’.71 
On these plausible definitions, egg-sharing may not be altruistic, but it remains consistent 
with solidarity because it ‘reinforces the notion that many other couples are “in the same 
boat”’.72 
 Overall, the Tissues and Cells Directive does not require the UK to prohibit the provision 
of incentives to gamete donors and its relevance is largely restricted to the provision of 
financial rewards to those who donate gametes for the treatment of others. 
 
III. A NATIONAL SYSTEM AND INCENTIVISING POTENTIAL GAMETE DONORS 
 
The case for allowing financial incentives for gamete donation has received detailed 
consideration in the academic literature
73
 and in the policy documents of bodies such as the 
HFEA and the Nuffield Council on Bioethics.
74
 Three analogies have particular force against 
the widespread assumption that a ban is ethically required: the analogy with risky 
employment (eg working on an oil-rig or in a deep mine or working as a professional boxer, 
racing car driver, or fire-fighter), the analogy with existing commercialisation (80% of IVF is 
private and, in the words of Robert Winston, ‘IVF has become a massive commercial 
industry’75), and the analogy with the paid participation of healthy volunteers in clinical trials 
of pharmaceutical products (volunteers in clinical trials are permitted to receive large 
payments, subject to conditions such as the approval of an ethics committee).
76
 The risky 
employment analogy points out that other accepted paid activities carry significant risks or 
consequences and many give rise to no greater potential benefits, yet they are regulated rather 
than prohibited. The analogy with existing commercialisation points out that professionals 
who use donor gametes to treat or research are paid, often handsomely, for their services and 
the involuntarily childless now routinely pay large sums for access to assisted reproduction. 
The analogy with first-in-human trials points out that volunteer participants are 
‘overwhelmingly’ motivated by the offer of financial reward.77 Together these three analogies 
support a strong presumption in favour of providing a financial reward for the time, effort and 
inconvenience of gamete donation for both treatment and research, and they can be used to 
respond to many of the standard arguments against rewarding donors.  
By way of example, consider the relevance of the risky employment and first-in-human 
trials analogies to the view expressed by the HFEA in its 1998 consultation that financial 
incentives are to be rejected on the basis that is ‘possible’ for a donor to be ‘financially 
induced’ and this ‘might compromise the ability of the donor to consider fully the 
implications of the donation’.78 Those who, say, box professionally, work in a deep mine or 
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work on an oil rig can suffer serious inconvenience, injury or even death and it is similarly 
‘possible’ that they will have been ‘financially induced’ to participate, particularly those from 
disadvantaged backgrounds who have been subject to significant financial and social 
pressures.
79
 The benefits of donation for the treatment of others or medical research are at 
least as compelling as the benefits associated with these other activities, especially with 
regard to professional sports. To respond by reference to the higher quality of consent that is 
generally required for consensual bodily interventions and procedures in a medical context 
runs into the healthy volunteer trials analogy, which demonstrates acceptance of procedural 
mechanisms beyond outright prohibition for ensuring voluntariness in a medical context. 
 The three analogies do have evident limitations; some of which are more significant than 
others. Since the purportedly analogous activities do not involve the purchase of persons or 
body parts, appeal to these analogies does not support the commodification (purchase) of 
gametes,
80
 but these analogies do support the reward and recompense of donors. More 
significantly, these analogies do not fully address the concern that allowing financial 
incentives ultimately advantages the rich and powerful over the poor and vulnerable. It may 
be objected that the above analogies are satisfied by safeguards that are inadequate to ensure 
that proper account is taken of justice, equity and non-commercial research priorities. The 
risky employment analogy has nothing to say about those who can pay more than their 
competitors. The analogy with existing commercialisation reminds us that significant 
inequalities already exist; for example, those who can afford to attend the more expensive 
clinics or travel within and beyond the UK already have a greater range of opportunities than 
those reliant upon NHS-funded treatment. The analogy with healthy volunteer trials reminds 
us that referral to an ethics committee is one way to limit the magnification of inequalities, 
but perhaps more would be required to ensure that appropriate access to IVF treatment does 
not become even more expensive due to the cost of paying donors and that the priorities of 
embryo research are not left to large commercial entities. One way of addressing such issues 
is by putting control of payment and, most crucially of all, distribution of acquired gametes 
into the hands of a national non-profit body.
81
 
 The HFEA did not address financial incentives in its 2011 consultation, at least in part 
because it was operating on the assumption that the “law prohibits the payment of donors”82 
(on which see above). But we have seen that the latest policies of the HFEA do set fixed sum 
payments for those who donate (albeit payments tracking recompense rather than reward) and 
it is worth noting that others have expressed support for the idea of rewarding those who 
donate gametes for research (not least of which is the recent report of the Nuffield Council, 
which heavily relies on the analogy with healthy volunteer trials).
83
 Nonetheless, support for 
a national donation system is much stronger than support for financial incentives and there 
are other types of incentives that are more likely to attract support. The rest of this article will 
therefore focus on the potential of a national gamete donation system to use the allocation of 
gametes to incentivise additional donations. 
The existing system for the donation and allocation of bodily materials for transfusion 
and transplantation into patients is currently administered by NHS Blood and Transplant 
(NHSBT). This body operates in accordance with regulatory guidance set by other regulatory 
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bodies, including the Human Tissue Authority (HTA)—a body that is to have the same fate 
as the HFEA.
84
 NHSBT has been relatively successful in controlling supply and demand for 
blood. Blood shortages in the UK are now rare,
85
 although blood supplies remain under 
constant pressure and there have been seasonal shortages of some blood groups.
86
 One reason 
for the constant pressure is that donors represent a tiny minority of potential donors: 
according to NHSBT, ‘96% of us rely on the other 4% to give blood’.87 The problem is far 
worse for the supply of solid organs, where shortages mean that hundreds of patients die each 
year from organ failure while waiting for a transplant.
88
 NHSBT has adopted detailed 
procedures to ensure that organs donated for transplantation are fairly and appropriately 
matched and allocated to patients.
89
 Patients waiting for transplants are registered on the 
National Transplant Database and a computer programme is used to identify the best matched 
patients (taking account of factors such as blood group, age, and size of both the donor and 
recipient) or, alternatively, the transplant unit to which the organ is to be offered. The 
relevant criteria are ‘determined by the medical profession in consultation with other health 
professionals, the Department of Health and specialist advisory groups’.90 The resulting 
allocation algorithms are complex and vary according to the type of organ. In complex cases 
patients are prioritised according to a point score, whereby organs are allocated to the patients 
with the highest number of points. Points are allocated for factors such as time on the waiting 
list, tissue match, age difference between donor and patient, location of the patient relative to 
the donor, etc. NHSBT assessment and allocation policies have not gone without academic 
criticism,
91
 but generally seem to operate fairly. 
If the UK were to extend the remit of the NHSBT (or set up an equivalent body) to 
administer gamete acquisition and allocation, it could remove the significant regional 
variations and inequalities of access that currently beset the use of donor gametes in fertility 
treatment and it could enable centralised support for research uses of gametes. The 
considerations of justice, transparency and equality that apply to organ donation for 
transplantation have equivalent relevance to gamete donation. The adoption of a points-based 
system for the allocation of gametes for treatment would similarly enable a range of factors to 
be properly balanced in the just distribution of this scarce resource.  
Identifying and weighing the relevant factors for gamete donation can only use the organ 
donation system as a model if the differences between the two types of donation are 
recognised. The two systems have different goals: organs donated for transplantation are used 
to replace the functions of failing organs, whereas gametes donated for fertility treatment are 
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used to address involuntary childlessness.
92
 It follows that whereas the relative medical 
urgency of a transplant can be measured in terms of the predicted time until organ failure, the 
relative medical urgency of fertility treatment would need to track the predicted time left for 
which pregnancy is a realistic and appropriately safe prospect.
93
 Time on the waiting list 
raises the same considerations of justice and equity and can be identified in the same way for 
both systems. In the case of gamete donation, it may also be appropriate to give weight to the 
need for gametes to avoid the transmission of serious genetic disease, since this can be 
identified by medical criteria, is already regarded as a relevant factor by the 1990 Act,
94
 and 
generally has a wider impact on healthcare resources. One way of doing this would be grant 
those who require gametes to avoid the transmission of a genetic disease points 
corresponding to something like the number of points obtained after the mean waiting time.
95
 
The organ allocation system thus provides a model for some aspects of a gamete allocation 
system but not all. We have seen that the organ allocation system has a procedure for 
reviewing and establishing the specific weight given to the factors identified as relevant, a 
similar procedure is required for gamete allocation if it is to be made transparent and 
removed from the unregulated discretion of individual clinics. 
 At present, prospective parents select individual donors on the basis of their traits, such as 
matching physical characteristics and ethnic background. If we continue to accept this 
practice (and such selection is controversial),
96
 the larger pool of gametes held by a national 
system should facilitate such choices. The allocation system could take account of patient-
specified matching criteria, whereby the gametes of donors who have certain characteristics 
are allocated only to those who have specified those characteristics or have chosen not to 
express any such preference. 
The national coordination of gamete donation would also enable the implementation of 
other methods of encouraging gamete donation, which will be explored below. 
 
A. Mirror Exchange 
 
An additional feature of the national system for managing organ donations from living donors 
for transplantation is that it admits a type of non-financial incentive. It allows ‘mirror 
exchange’, whereby recipient X recruits a donor to supply an organ in exchange for an organ 
supplied by someone recruited by recipient Y. Two types of mirror organ exchange 
programme are currently administered by NHSBT. The first is ‘paired donation’. Imagine 
that Arthur needs a kidney transplant and has a willing donor but that donor is not a suitable 
tissue match. If Bella is in the same position she could receive the kidney from Arthur’s 
donor and Arthur would receive the kidney from Bella’s donor. Alternatively, there is 
‘pooled donation’. Imagine that Bella’s donor is not a tissue match for Arthur, and Celia also 
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needs a kidney and has a willing donor who is not a match to her. It is possible to arrange a 
chain of paired donations if Arthur’s donor is a match for Celia’s donor and Celia is a match 
for Bella’s donor. 
Since the current gamete donation system permits the donation of gametes to someone 
you know or a stranger and the organ allocation system permits paired and pooled donation, 
few ethical issues should be raised by putting the two together to provide for the paired and 
pooled donation of gametes. The Tissues and Cells Directive applies equally to both activities 
and paired/pooled donation is explicitly approved by the legalisation governing 
transplantation.
97
 Indeed, if we accept that rewarded egg-sharing is consistent with the values 
of altruism and solidarity, as evoked by the Tissues and Cells Directive, then it is difficult to 
avoid the conclusion that a mirror system for gamete donation is also to be regarded as 
compatible with those values. 
Applied to gametes, it would usually be the partner of the infertile person who provides 
the donor contribution. Like paired and pooled organ donation, this need not be the case. The 
donor could be someone else close to the person in need who is willing to help but unable to 
donate directly to that person. In the case of gamete donation, the inability to donate directly 
to the person in need could stem from the impermissibility of mixing the gametes of close 
genetic relatives.
98
 A sister is not, for example, able to donate eggs directly to her brother so 
that he can have children with his partner, but she would be able to donate in a mirror 
exchange system to enable her brother to receive an egg from another donor. With gametes, 
unlike organs, the donor could even be the person who wishes to receive donor gametes from 
another. A single woman would be able to donate her own eggs in exchange for the sperm of 
a man whose female partner is infertile. It is difficult to predict the extent to which a mirror 
exchange system modelled on that applying to organs would increase the supply of gametes 
for treatment, but these hypothetical examples suggest it could be attractive to at least some 
of those who would not otherwise donate. Mirror exchange has already been shown to be 
successful for organs: in the last year ‘paired and pooled donations contributed more than 60 
kidney transplants between them’.99 The two examples just presented also highlight the 
relevance of altruism (the first example) and solidarity (particularly the second example) to 
gamete mirror exchange. 
Unlike organ donation, where both pairs donate and receive the same organ, the donor in 
one pair will often be shouldering more of a burden than the donor in the exchange couple. 
Sperm donation involves a series of appointments for health screening and blood and semen 
tests, but the donation itself is not invasive.
100
 Whereas egg donation involves hormonal 
medication, ultrasound scanning, and a surgical procedure to remove the eggs; and this 
process carries the risk of complications, such ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome (OHSS).
101
 
In short, egg donation is more invasive and risky than sperm donation. One possible response 
would be for the mirror exchange programme to adopt the approach taken in egg-sharing 
arrangements, whereby egg donation is restricted to situations where the woman is already 
having eggs removed for her own IVF treatment.
102
 But such a response is likely to create or 
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increase another disparity, namely, unequal numbers of egg and sperm donors suitable for 
mirror exchange. It is also unnecessary, because it is inappropriate paternalism to prevent a 
woman from deciding for herself whether the disparity is one that she is prepared to accept 
and there is no disparity in the benefit that both couples will receive from the exchange—
both couples receive the gametes they need to have children. 
 The analogy with living organ donation supports the view that mirror exchange is an 
acceptable system to apply to gametes and demonstrates how a national gamete donation 
system could facilitate the adoption of ethical incentives. The next section will consider the 
possibility of adjusting the mirror exchange system to take account of additional factors and 
thereby adopting an indirect mirror exchange system as a preferable alternative to strict 
mirror exchange. 
 
B. Indirect Mirror Exchange 
 
According to Pennings, the strict reciprocity of mirror exchange is problematic because it 
excludes several groups. It excludes those who have ‘medical and/or genetic 
contraindications’ to participation, such as being too old to donate, and those who have few 
family members or friends of the right age and sex to ask to become donors.
103
 It also 
excludes those prospective parents who do ‘not intend to disclose the donor origin of their 
child’, as participating in a mirror exchange system in which donor anonymity is not assured 
would ‘seriously jeopardise this goal’.104  
 The exclusion of such groups from a mirror exchange system does highlight a tension 
between its strict reciprocity and the interests of justice and equity tracked by the points-
based system. Pennings offers an alternative way of addressing this tension, whereby we may 
take account of the willingness to donate or encourage others to donate while retaining 
equity, justice and need as the primary governing principles. He suggests that a point system 
could and should be combined with an indirect form of exchange, whereby bonus points are 
‘allocated for the contribution of the partner’ and for partners who ‘sincerely intend to 
contribute’.105 If need and equality are to remain governing principles, then non-contributors 
must still be able to reach the top within a reasonable time. Pennings therefore further 
suggests that the number of bonus points awarded for gamete contributions should 
correspond to something like the number of points obtained after the mean waiting time.
106
  
 Pennings’ proposal seems to represent an ethical way of incentivising further gamete 
donations. In addition to the argument by analogy with mirror exchange for the ethical 
acceptability of taking account of donor contributions, it can be argued that such a system 
would encourage recipients to do what they ought to do. A number of theorists have 
advanced the view, premised in the idea of ‘special rights’ (Hart), or the ‘principle of 
fairness’ (Rawls), that those who receive a benefit from their voluntary participation in a 
cooperative system are morally required to contribute their share to that system.
107
 Such a 
view could also be considered to be an element of the notion of solidarity, which is appealed 
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to by recital 18 of the Tissues and Cells Directive. The willingness to give before one takes 
instantiates the principle of solidarity. 
 Pennings’ proposal does not, however, address other limitations of the mirror exchange 
system. One is particularly relevant to the focus of this article: mirror exchange is incapable 
of encouraging and rewarding donor contributions that are not directly exchanged for 
gametes. This includes the donation of eggs for research. Another is significant for those who 
are not persuaded by the above response to the additional burden of egg donation compared 
to sperm donation,
108
 ie the fact that the mirror exchange system cannot treat egg donation as 
more valuable than sperm donation. The essential issue is that Pennings envisages the donor 
contribution to be gametes (eggs exchanged for sperm and vice versa, where both are 
accorded equal worth) supplied by the infertile person’s partner. 
 It is true that we need to be careful not to include too many factors in a points system to 
ensure that it is practical to run and transparent for patients.
109
 But if we accept the 
permissibility and practicality of a points system in which gamete contributions are granted 
points, it is but a small step to grant points to all donations of bodily materials for treatment 
or research. This would include the allocation of points for egg donation for research and for 
donations of other bodily material. 
 The number of bonus points allocated for the contribution would need to be proportionate 
to the value of the donated bodily material and other morally relevant factors, such as medical 
urgency and waiting time. It has already been suggested that setting this level would need to 
be done in a similar way to what currently takes place for organ allocation. Once the relevant 
level of points is set, this information can be easily conveyed to patients using a simple table 
or information sheet, and then programmed into a computer for the selection of recipients 
from those on the waiting list. 
 Imagine a heterosexual couple who require sperm because the male partner does not 
produce sperm. The female partner may be willing to donate her eggs in exchange for quicker 
access to donor sperm, but not be willing for another woman to have ‘her’ child if her own 
treatment were unsuccessful.110 If she is willing to consider donation for research, she could 
be told that donating eggs for research would give her a specified number of bonus points 
(which could be set according to the number granted for the mean waiting time) and given the 
opportunity to choose between a set number of research projects (no more than say five) that 
have been approved for donor recruitment at that clinic or regional hub. None of these 
projects would involve research taking place at the clinic at which this patient is receiving 
treatment to minimise the likelihood that the clinic will put (witting or unwitting) pressure on 
her to donate for research or for their particular project. 
 A key potential objection to taking account of gamete donation for research when 
allocating donor gametes for treatment would seem to be that gamete donation for research is 
less important or at least not sufficiently important to justify national facilitation via such a 
system. Such an objection overlooks the fact that the UK legislation already accepts the 
permissibility of research using gametes and embryos (see above) and the importance of such 
research to the maintenance and development of medical treatment, including past and future 
infertility treatment. 
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 Imagine, instead, a lesbian couple where both women have healthy eggs but are too old to 
be accepted as egg donors for another’s fertility treatment.111 If they are willing to contribute 
blood for the next two years in exchange for quicker access to donor sperm, they could be 
told that they may obtain a set number of bonus points to improve their waiting list ranking 
by committing to one of the recognised donation schemes. Blood transfusions can be life-
saving and blood supplies are under constant pressure, yet blood donation is a relatively 
simple process and raises far fewer issues for the donor compared to gamete donation. On the 
face of it, there seems to be no reason why rewarding contributions in a points-based system 
could not also reward previous and prospective blood donations from the person or couple 
who are to receive treatment. The level of points granted for blood donation compared to 
gamete donation would need to be set periodically in accordance with supply and demand. I 
have deliberately chosen blood donation as the example because the case for rewarding blood 
donation to increase supply is much weaker than the case for rewarding donations of solid 
organs. 
There are at least two plausible objections to extending indirect mirror exchange beyond 
donor contributions of gametes. 
 The first plausible objection is that there is already a prima facie ethical obligation to 
donate blood, unlike gametes, and it is inappropriate to reward people for doing what they 
already have an obligation to do. There are good reasons to accept the first part of this claim. 
The conditions for the imposition of moral duties to assist those in need have been fully 
explored in the literature.
112
 These are: (1) the assistance must be required to protect 
another’s important interests; (2) the person on whom the burden of assistance falls must be 
in a position to assist; (3) the assistance must not impose an unreasonable burden; and (4) the 
persons requiring assistance must not be in a position to self-assist. Blood donation required 
for life-saving transfusion generally satisfies those conditions, because it is clearly needed to 
protect another’s important interests, you know or ought to know that this is so, providing 
blood does not usually impose an unreasonable burden on you relative to the life of those in 
need of blood, and those in need of an blood transfusion are usually in no position to assist 
themselves. In contrast, gamete donation (like organ donation) generally involves a 
disproportionate burden on the assister. Gamete donation is likely to engage deep social and 
moral beliefs, because embryo research involves the destruction of an entity that could 
develop into a human person and donated gametes used for fertility treatment are intended to 
create a biological child who will be able to obtain identifying information about the donor at 
the age of 18. Egg donation also requires drug-induced stimulation of the ovaries and 
invasive surgery with attended risks to health and even life. Thus, there is indeed already a 
prima facie obligation to donate blood but not such an obligation to donate gametes. 
 The second part of the first plausible objection is less convincing because the existence of 
a duty to assist does not imply the impermissibility of seeking to motivate people to act in 
accordance with their moral obligations. The law does not generally enforce duties to assist 
individuals
113
 and does not generally require individuals to assist the achievement of social 
goods, save through taxation. One exception to the latter is jury participation, which the 
HFEA previously used analogically to set the maximum daily compensation level for gamete 
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donation.
114
 Jury service is necessary for the maintenance of a criminal justice system of the 
type adopted in the UK and can place considerable burdens on jurors in relation to freedom of 
speech and physical liberty during a trial.
115
 These burdens do not, however, involve the 
physical invasion of one’s body, are less likely to give rise to legitimate conscientious 
objection and can be legally enforced in an ethically appropriate and proportionate manner. 
Thus, rewarding compliance with positive duties to donate blood is generally preferable to 
legally enforcing such duties. 
The second plausible objection to extending points-based allocation to encompass donor 
contributions of blood is that such an action would be counterproductive because it would 
negatively affect blood donation rates and threaten the motivational effect of altruism and 
solidarity within the current blood donation system. A similar objection to this was made by 
Titmuss, who argued that allowing payment for blood donation would negatively affect the 
‘gift relationship’,116 in the sense that payment would discourage altruistic donation and 
weaken the persuasive force of the argument of solidarity. Of course, Titmuss did not himself 
consider benefits-in-kind of the kind adopted in an indirect mirror exchange system and there 
is no empirical research on this matter. Such an objection could therefore not support the 
blanket exclusion of rewarding blood and solid organ contributions in an indirect mirror 
exchange system, rather it points to the need to pilot the system first.  
Any new gamete allocation system will need to be piloted before being adopted. The idea 
that rewarding donor contributions when allocating gametes could increase the supply of 
gametes is supported by the trial of a less ambitious system.
117
 The present proposal is more 
ambitious because it envisages a system of gamete allocation that takes account of gamete 
donations for treatment, gamete donations for research and even donations of other bodily 
materials for transfusion and transplantation. Such a system is likely to fail to motivate 
additional donations if those in need of gametes are not incentivised by what they expect to 
get in return for their contribution, and this will require carefully piloting and monitoring. 
That is not to suggest that the ethical justification for indirect mirror exchange is coterminous 
with its predicted success at increasing donor contributions. At least parts of its justification 
stems from the view that it is fair and appropriate to take account of the willingness to donate 
bodily material when allocating gametes, and this is supported by the principle of solidarity. 
 
C. Returning a Donation to the Allocation Pool 
 
Creating embryos outside the body for assisted reproduction can result in the creation of more 
embryos than are immediately implanted into a woman’s body—sometimes referred to as 
‘spare’ or ‘surplus’ embryos. At present, such embryos created using a donor egg or sperm 
may be frozen and kept within the statutory storage period
118
 as long as neither gamete 
provider withdraws consent. Many of these stored embryos will be discarded months or years 
later when those receiving treatment decide that they have no more use for them or the 
statutory storage period expires. Donation to another woman or couple is a possibility but not 
a requirement. This is so even though destruction is likely to frustrate the intentions of the 
gamete donor and even though embryos are needed for treatment and research. This is worth 
considering in the context of a hypothetical national donation system, because such a system 
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could operate to reduce the loss of these embryos by allocating additional points to those who 
agree to donate any resultant embryos that they do not use within a set period of time. It is 
even possible to link the points to the storage period, so that a couple wanting to, say, create 
an embryo using donor sperm could get points for agreeing that any unimplanted embryos are 
donated after ten years and additional points for agreeing to donation after only five years. 
Such a system would not lead to women implanting problematic numbers of embryos to 
ensure that none remained for storage because the HFEA already severely restricts the 
number that may be implanted at any one time.
119
 
 Would this, however, effectively coerce those seeking access to donor reproductive 
material into donating their own material or rushing subsequent decisions on whether to use 
the stored embryos themselves? This question carries two concerns. The first has been 
overstated, because the proposed system is not making donation compulsory, rather it is 
providing a slight incentive to those who agree to donation in advance. Those seeking access 
to donation cannot coherently object to donation in principle and, indeed, the principle of 
solidarity (and, in the case of blood, general positive duties) supports a prima facie obligation 
to donate. With regard to the second concern, it should be borne in mind that the law already 
takes the view that the option of using frozen embryos should not be kept open indefinitely, 
as shown by the existence of the statutory storage period. Nonetheless, any such system 
would need to be able to take account of genuine reasons (eg illness) for later extending the 
storage period. 
  
V. CONCLUSION 
 
 
This article has examined the potential role that a national donation system could play in the 
legal and ethical implementation of incentives to gamete donation. It argues that a national 
donation system could enable the implementation of an ethically defensible mirror exchange 
system, but a preferable way to incentivise gamete donation for both treatment and research 
would be through a system of indirect mirror exchange. Such a system would enable the 
allocation of gametes to track factors such as medical urgency, waiting time and (perhaps) 
avoidance of transmission genetic disease, while also rewarding donor contributions. An 
indirect mirror exchange system of this type could operate alongside or instead of an ethically 
implemented system of payment of donors. 
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